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I. INTRODUCTION
With the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, the Cultural Revolution in
China came to an end. With it, the long-standing policy of a closed
centralized market that was mostly off limits to foreign investors, was
also terminated.' When Deng Xiaoping came to power in 1978,2 his
party of reformers led a movement within the Communist Party (Party)
to create a more decentralized, market-orientated, incentive-based
economy that was open to international trade.' In doing so, he came to
recognize the positive contributions that law could render to the social
stability of China. Mr. Xiaoping quickly began to push for a rapid
restoration and augmentation of the legal system to prevent the return of
arbitrary personal rule and the instability accompanying such rule.' As a
part of this new policy, the reformers sought to increase the People's
Republic of China's (PRC) involvement in international trade and to
encourage foreign investment within China.' In order to do so, the Party
had to build a new legal system favoring market-oriented contract law
and foreign investment.'
During the ten years after Deng Xiaoping came to power, the Chinese
legal system enacted hundreds of statutes8 and increased the number of
legal practitioners,9 which in turn caused the number of contracts to
1. China has a long isolationist history that has strictly forbidden any
international trade or any type of interaction with foreigners. Although there have been
many breaks from this policy during the past 2,000 years, a closed policy to foreigners
has been the norm. See Lester Ross, Force Majeure and Related Doctrines of Excuse in
Contract Law of the People's Republic of China, 5 J. CHINESE L. 58 (1991), reprinted in
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AGREEMENTS IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 135 (Ralph
Folsom & W. Davis Folsom ed., 1996).
2. Deng Xiaoping was the Chinese Premier from 1978 to 1993.
3. See Ross, supra note 1, at 59. This policy, often referred to as the two-system
government, mixes a centralized government with an open market economy. This was a
drastic break from the socialist norm of having a central government and a centrally
planned economy, as seen in the former communist government of the Soviet Union.
See id.
4. See id. at 66.
5. See id.
6. See id. at 59.
7. See, e.g., ALBERT H.Y. CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 37 (1992). China re-established the Supreme People's
Procturate in 1978 and the Ministry of Justice in 1979. Id.
8. See, e.g., ZHONGGUO RENMIN GONGHEHUO FALU HUIBIAN (Legal Compendia
of the People's Republic of China) (1979-1984, then annual) (Chinese statutes and
regulations are not codified in a series similar to that of the United States and other
Western nations. Many Chinese regulations overlap one another and many sources must
be consulted in order to asses the current law. Some of the best sources for current
enactments of statutes and regulations are the numerous national newspapers published
by the central, provincial, and municipal governments.).
9. See, e.g., 1990 ZHONGGUO TONGJI NIANJIAN 812 (1990) (Statistical Yearbook
of China). At the end of 1989, there were 43,715 lawyers in China. In 1989, 109,609
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explode. China was well on its way to an open market economy.
On March 21, 1985, the Tenth Session of the Standing Committee of
the Sixth National People's Congress promulgated the Law of the
People's Republic of China on Economic Contracts Involving Foreign
Interest (FECL), which became effective on July 1, 1985." This was the
first substantive set of regulations that allowed private Chinese citizens
to contract openly with foreign investors and individuals. Prior to the
promulgation of the FECL, any party wishing to conduct contractual
negotiations with a Chinese party had to do so under the 1981 Economic
Contract Law of the People's Republic of China (ECL). 2 The laws were
primarily designed to cover contracts between domestic parties.
Prior to the promulgation of the FECL, Deng Xiaoping and his
reformers decided their next goal was to place the PRC into the world
stage as a legitimate player in the international business realm. 3
However, the shift from an isolationist nation to a major player in the
global economy takes time. For example, In 1980, China became a
signatory to the United Nations Conference on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods 4 (CISG), but it took China six years to ratify
clients retained lawyers on annual retainers, and lawyers handled hundreds of thousands
of matters for these and other clients, including 14,594 matters affecting foreign
interests. See id.
10. See Ross, supra note 1, at 66. By the year 1990, the number of written
economic contracts far exceeded 700 million per year and continued to grow, forcing the
Chinese government to push for further standardization of contractual language. See
GUOWUYUAN BANGONGTING ZHUANFA GUOJIA GONGSHANG XINGZHENG GUANLI JU
GUANYU ZAI QUANGUO AHUBA TUIZING JINGJI HETONG SHIFAN WENBEN ZHIDU QINGSHI
DE TONGZHI (Administrative Office of the State Council Notice Disseminating the
Request of the State Administration of Industry and Commerce to Publicize Model
Economic Contract Documents) (May 26, 1990).
11. The Law of the People's Republic of China on Economic Contracts Involving
Foreign Interest (commonly referred to as the Foreign Economic Contract Law of the
People's Republic of China), adopted Mar. 21, 1985 at the 10th Sess. of the Standing
Committee of the 6th National People's Congress, effective July 1, 1985, translated in 1
CHINA LAW FOR FOREIGN BUSINESS ch. III [hereinafter FECL].
12. Economic Contract Law for the People's Republic of China, adopted Dec. 13,
1981 by the 4th Sess. of the 5th National People's Congress, effective July 1, 1982
(amended 1993), translated in 1 CHINA LAWS FOR FOREIGN BUSINESS ch. IV, reprinted in
1 CHINA LAWS FOR FOREIGN BUSINESS (Stephen Fitzgerald ed., 1993) [hereinafter ECL].
13. See Ross, supra note 1, at 59.
14. UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE
OF GOODS, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.97/19 (1980), reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 668 and 52 Fed.
Regs. 6264, available at http://www.uncitral.org/english/texts/sales/CISG.htm
[hereinafter CISG]. The convention was held in Vienna, Austria from March 10 to April
11, 1980. Id.
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the CISG." Nonetheless, by ratifying the CISG in 1986, China became
only the ninth country to do so.'6  However, as one can imagine, the
mere act of becoming a signatory state to international agreements does
not coordinate one's laws and regulations with international norms. This
maxim proved to be true during the tragic events of the summer of 1989
in Tian'anmen Square.
Shortly after the events of 1989, the leading officials that had
supported the genuine rule of law over the rule of man were quickly
removed from power and more authoritarian leadership took over." It
was during this shaky period that thousands of foreign corporations and
entities pulled out of China. Many lawsuits for breach of contract
followed these events as Western companies rushed to remove
employees and agents from the Chinese mainland. It was probably the
greatest introduction that China could wish for, of the important role that
force majeure plays in the international marketplace.'8
This paper is designed to provide the reader with a general
understanding of the force majeure clauses of both the old and new
Chinese contract laws and their relation to the CISG. Section II will
delve deeper into the Chinese concepts of force majeure and historical
and moderns beliefs concerning excuse of performance. Section III will
analyze the various provisions that apply to a force majeure event within
the FECL, namely Articles 24 and 25, as well as the damage provisions
relating to a force majeure event. Section IV will analyze Article 79 of
the CISG; provisions pertaining to a breach by a third party, recovery of
damages, and passage of risk will also be examined. Section V will
study the application of the CISG within China, as well, as the
15. See Id.
16. China signed the CISG on September 30, 1981 and ratified it on December 11,
1986, along with Italy and the United States, available at http://www.cisg.law.
pace.edu/cisg/cisgintro.html. Countries signing prior to China, in chronological order
were: Lesotho (June 1981), France (August 1982), the Syrian Arab Republic (October
1982), Egypt (December 1982), Hungary (June 1983), Argentina (July 1983),
Yugoslavia (March 1985), and Zambia (June 1986). See id.
17. See Ross, supra note 1, at 135. The events of Tian'anmen Square threatened
China's beginning as a nation with an open market economy and scared investors
worldwide from engaging in contracts with Chinese parties. Id. It took some time for
foreign investors to return to China, although life within China quickly returned to
normal. Id.
18. See FECL, supra note 11, art. 24. Article 24 of the FECL defines force
majeure as "am event that cannot be anticipated at the time of the signing of the contract
by the parties concerned, and event of which the occurrence and aftermath are neither
avoidable nor surmountable." id.; see also Stephanie J. Mitchell & David D. Stein,
United States-Chinese Commercial Contract, 20 INT'L LAW. 897, 910 n.35 (1986).
Force Majeure or vis major is defined as a loss that results from a natural cause without
the intervention of man, and could not have been prevented by the exercise of prudence,
diligence, and care. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1086 (6th ed. 1991).
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application of the FECL. Section VI will prepare an analysis of the New
Contract Law (NCL) of the People's Republic of China, and attempt to
determine whether or not the new provisions are an enhancement of the
old FECL. In particular, Articles 94, 96, 117, 118, and the applicable
recovery of damage provisions will be reviewed. Section VII will focus
on how the Chinese courts will theoretically apply the CISG, in
comparison to the new provisions of the NCL, in an international setting.
II. THE CONCEPT OF FORCE MAJEURE IN CHINESE LAW
Prior to 1989, very little, if any, attention was given by the Chinese to
the notion of force majeure among contracts with foreign parties.' 9 This
lack of attention is attributable to several factors. First, the role of law
was never given great weight in Chinese society; the various Chinese
rulers dismissed law as being inevitably imperfect and even as a harmful
effort by mortal beings to govern society. 0 Second, private commercial
practices did not achieve a comparable level of development in China.2'
Thus, force majeure, like other commercial law doctrines, did not
develop because China lacked the incentive to expand international trade
relations.2
The concept of force majeure, as it has developed in China, follows
the French choice of words, which connotes a superior or irresistible
force. 3  The Chinese use the phrase "bti ko kbng l°," which literall'
means "not possible, resist force" or more suitably, "irresistible force."
Such provisions have been incorporated in all of China's three main
contract laws.25 However, in addition to the specific governing contract
19. See FECL, supra note 11.
20. See Ross, supra note 1 at 58.
21. See id. During the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911), various Chinese emperors
rejected commercial intercourse with the West, believing that China's tightly controlled
economy had nothing to gain from international trade. It was this belief and policy that
contributed to the British and French invasion of China and the Opium Wars which
forced the Chinese emperor to open several port cities of China to international trade.
See MILTON W. MEYER, CHINA: A CONCISE HISTORY 394 (1994).
22. See Ross, supra note 1, at 58.
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. The three main contract laws of China are the Economic Contract Law of the
People's Republic of China (ECL), supra note 12, the Law of the People's Republic of
China on Economic Contracts Involving Foreign Interest (FECL), supra note 11, and the
Technology Contract Law of the People's Republic of China (TCL). See Daniel
Rubenstein, Legal and Institutional Uncertainties in the Domestic Contract Law of the
People's Republic of China, 42 MCGILL L.J. 495, 497 n.3.
law, one must also look towards the basic concepts of contract law as
outlined by the General Principles of the Civil Law of the People's
Republic of China (General Principles). 6 The General Principles
promulgate the basic principles in all civil law, including contract law,
while the Economic Contract Law, the Foreign Economic Contract Law,
and the Technology Contract Law set forth the substantive standards for
contracts in those respective fields.27
The applicable articles of the General Principles outline the excuses
for nonperformance that derive out of a force majeure event. The
General Principles state: "Citizens and legal persons that breach a
contract or that do not perform other responsibilities shall bear civil
liability thereof .. [u]nless otherwise stipulated by the law, no civil
liability shall be borne for the inability to perform a contract or for harm
caused to others due to force majeure. ,28 Force majeure is then
further defined by Article 153 of the General Principles as relating to
any event that is unforeseeable, unavoidable, and insurmountable.29
Article 153 thereby creates a three-prong subjective test for a force
majeure defense3° (i.e.., unforeseeable, unavoidable, and insurmountable). 3'
This is a rather difficult test to apply, since the General Principles do
not enumerate the various conditions that could define what is
unavoidable, unforeseeable, and insurmountable. 32 However, in Chinese
contract practice, these three prongs generally refer to natural events of
unavoidable force that could not have arisen from any human
intervention (i.e. flood, fire, storm, earthquake, and other natural
disasters).33 On the other hand, the reach of force majeure has expanded
in most countries, with the exception of China, as the result of
consensual bargaining and through the evolution of judicial doctrine and
26. The General Principles of the Civil Law of the People's Republic of China,
adopted by the 4th Sess. of the 6th National People's Congress on April 12, 1986,
effective Jan. 1 1987, reprinted in 4 CHINA L. REPORTER 91 (1987) [hereinafter General
Principles].
27. See Ping Jiang, Drafting the Uniform Contract Law in China, Lecture
Delivered at the Center for Chinese Legal Studies, Columbia Law School, in 10 COLUM.
J. ASIAN L. 245 (1996). The General Principles provide the necessary backbone for the
Chinese legal system. General Principles, supra note 26. They act as a general filler for
times when questions arise under the specific laws governing a certain area. Id.
Although the General Principles provide general guidance as to how laws operate, it is
always necessary to review the specific regulations in a certain area. Id.
28. General Principles, supra note 26, arts. 106-07.
29. Id.
30. See Ross, supra note 1, at 70.
31. See id. These three prongs are viewed as being "bO ndng" or "not able" or
"inability" conditions that require the non-performing party to have an inability to fulfill
their contractual obligations due to outside forces. See id.
32. See id.
33. See HENRY ZHENG, CHINA'S CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL LAW 68 (1988).
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statutory language.34 Force majeure now refers to natural events as well
as such calamities as war, civil strife, and government unrest, which
stem from human causes.3" Some courts have even gone as far as
allowing a state-owned enterprise to declare force majeure, even when
their breach was caused by a change in policy by the very government
which controls them. 6 Therefore, to understand the make up of China's
force majeure clauses, this article reviews the regulations and laws that
provide for such an excuse.
III. LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON ECONOMIC
CONTRACTS INVOLVING FOREIGN INTEREST (FECL)
The Law of the People's Republic of China on Economic Contracts
Involving Foreign Interest or commonly referred to as the Foreign
Economic Contract Law of China (FECL), enacted on March 21, 1985,
separates contracts that involve foreign parties from the Economic
Contract Law of China (ECL).37 The excuse provisions that provide for
a force majeure defense can be found in Articles 24 and 25 of the
FECL.38 However, the provisions, like most Chinese regulations, are
rather general and ambiguous.
A. Force Majeure Provisions
1. Article 24 of the Foreign Economic Contract Law (FECL)
The main force majeure provision of the FECL is Article 24, which
provides:
A party should be exempted from his obligations in whole or in part in case
he fails to perform all or part of his obligations as a result of a force majeure
event.
34. See Ross, supra note 1, at 61.
35. See id.
36. See id. Such events are becoming increasingly less relevant in China as more
and more of the State-owned enterprises are becoming privately owned. However, the
Chinese government still maintains ownership and control over many areas of industry
such as transportation, oil and other mineral rights, communications and real property.
See id.
37. ECL, supra note 12. The Economic Contract Law (ECL) of the PRC will not
be discussed in this paper at any length. For more discussion on the ECL, see, e.g., Ross,
supra note 1; ZHENG, supra note 33.
38. See FECL, supra note 11, arts. 24-25.
In case a party cannot perform his obligations within the time limit set in
the contract due to a force majeure event, he should be relieved from the
liability for delayed performance during the period of continued influence of the
effects of the event. An event of force majeure means the event that the parties
could not foresee at the time of conclusion of the contract and its occurrence
and consequences cannot be avoided and cannot be overcome.
The scope of force majeure events may be specified in the contract.
When dealing with the FECL, the application of a force majeure
defense can be difficult, due to vagueness and ambiguity. This is
compounded further by the fact that China does not compile a written
record or series of court opinions that could be consulted for guidance.4"
One problem is that Article 24 allows parties to stipulate to the scope of
events that would qualify as a force majeure event, yet at the same time,
the article defines a force majeure event as one that is "unforeseeable"
and therefore, incapable of stipulation at the time the contract is
executed.4' Chinese courts have been known to hold that when parties
were able to stipulate to a specific event in a contractual force majeure
clause and that event actually occurs, the event was foreseeable, andS 41
therefore, does not qualify as a force majeure event under Article 24.
Another problematic area is that Chinese and foreign parties often
disagree on whether certain specified events, such as governmental
interference and labor disputes, should be considered force majeure.3
For example, an official from the Ministry of Foreign Economic
Relations and Trade of the PRC (MOFERT) stated that labor strikes
"can hardly be explained as unavoidable by either party concerned, thus
it is inappropriate to list [labor] strikes as force majeure in general terms
in a contract." The Chinese often argue that a labor dispute that cannot
be prevented by a foreign party or is beyond their control should not be
considered as a force majeure event since the party signing the contract
39. See id.
40. See, e.g., Zhao Yan, A Comparative Study of the Uniform Commercial Code
and the Foreign Economic Contract Law of the People's Republic of China, 6 INT'L TAX
Bus 26, 28-29 (1988).
41. See Ross, supra note 1, at 80.
42. See CORPORATE COUNSEL'S GUIDE TO DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA 251 (Kenneth
Cutshaw & Jianyi Zhang eds., 1995).
43. ZHENG, supra note 33, at 68; see also Zhongguo Shewai Jingi Hetong Fa
Zhong De "Bukekangli" Shijian Ying Ruhe Lijie, How to Understand Events of "Force
Majeure" in China's Foreign Economic Contract Law, in ECON. REPORTER 42 (Aug. 26,
1985); Mitchell & Stein, supra note 18, at 910.
44. MOFERT Official Answers to Questions on Foreign Economic Contract Law,
CHINA ECON. NEWS, July 29, 1985, at 1-2 ("MOFERT" stands for the Ministry of
Foreign Economics and Trade and is located in Beijing, China. For a discussion on
MOFERT's role within the China, see Zhang Yuqing & James S. McLean, China's
Foreign Economic Contract Law: Its Significance and Analysis, 8 J. INTL. L. Bus. 120,
124-126.).
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generally has a decisive role in resolving labor disputes.4 Furthermore,
the Chinese generally only consider governmental interference as force
majeure if the action was unforeseeable and the interference did not
already exist at the time the contract was formed.46
Although this theory of governmental interference is not terribly
different from Western beliefs of governmental interference, the Chinese
government can quickly and suddenly change their stance on issues,
laws, and regulations without notice. A Western businessman might
expect such a sudden change in position to be unforeseeable or
unavoidable.4 '7 However, a Chinese businessman would expect a sudden
change in laws and regulations by the Chinese government whenever a
legal doctrine or business practice begins to violate the public and
economic interest or social norms of China as set forth in Article 4 of the
FECL48 and Article 7 of the General Principles. For this reason, a
fixture in any Chinese law library or business department is a copy of
every major national and municipal newspaper published in the PRC.
Since the Chinese government issues new regulations, almost daily, one
45. See ZHENG, supra note 33, at 68; see also Zhongguo Shewai Jingi Hetong Fa
Zhong De "Bukekangli" Shijian Ying Ruhe Lijie, supra note 43, at 42.
46. CISG, supra note 14.
47. See CISG, supra note 14. Article 79(l) of the CISG states that a non-
performing party is not liable for failure to perform when: (a) the failure to perform was
"due to an impediment beyond his control;" (b) at the time of the contract, the party
"could not reasonably be expected to have taken the impediment into account;" and (c)
subsequent to the contract, the party could not reasonably be expected to "have avoided
or overcome [the obstacle] or its consequences." Id. art. 79(1); see also U.C.C. § 2-615
official cmt. n.l (1998) (The CISG and the U.C.C. embody the western theory of excuse
and force majeure. One not familiar with Chinese law and the way it can and does
suddenly change, would likely consider such sudden changes to be unforeseeable.).
48. FECL, supra note 11, art. 4. Article 4 of the FECL states: "Contracts must be
made in accordance with the law of the People's Republic of China and without
prejudice to the public interests of the People's Republic of China." Articles, such as
Article 4 of the FECL, can be found in almost every single set of codes and regulations
published by the PRC. See ZHONGGUO RENMIN GONGHEHUO FALU HUIBIAN, supra note
8; see also Zhang Yuping & James S. McLean, China's Economic Contract Law, Its
Significance and Analysis, 8 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 120, 129 (1987). Reservation
allows China to void any contract, law, or regulation that they have deemed to violate the
unwritten public interests of the PRC. See generally Chung-hua jen min kung ho kuo
she wai fa kuei hui pien, Laws and Regulations of The People's Republic of China
Governing Foreign-Related Matters 1991-1997, (Tran. Bureau of Legislative Affairs of
the State Council of the People's Republic of China, China Legal System Publishing
House) (1997).
49. General Principles, supra note 26, art. 7. Article 7 of the General Principles
states: "Civil acts should respect social morality and must not harm the public interest,
undermine the State economic plan nor disrupt the economic order of society." Id.
must constantly refer to the latest newspapers in order to stay abreast of
the newest changes. Due to this standard of practice by the government,
the Chinese have not accepted governmental interference as a force
majeure event unless the interference was completely unforeseeable,
unavoidable, and insurmountable. 0
Another troubling matter with the FECL is the time limit, imposed
upon a non-performing party to perform once they having claimed a
force majeure event. Article 24 permits a part to avoid being penalized
for late delivery if force majeure makes it impossible to render
performance within the specified time period.5  Furthermore, if
performance is completely impossible, then the party is released from
their obligation of performance. 2 However, if the other party still
depends on performance, the party claiming force majeure maintains the
obligation to perform under the contract.53
This time limit of performance, under Article 24 of the FECL, creates
a barrier for the party claiming a force majeure event. For example,
assume that party S sells 200 tons of logs to party B. Since there are no
passage of risk provisions in the FECL, party S will generally have
liability over the logs until they arrive at party B's place of business. 4
However, while en route through the South China Sea, the carriage
vessel sinks, resulting in a complete loss of cargo. Party S claims that
they are unable to deliver the goods, due to the loss of cargo.
Notification is immediately sent to B explaining why the cargo was lost.
Party B was completely reliant on S's performance, since these logs can
only be ordered through S. Therefore, B demands performance. S
informs B that a new shipment will be sent as soon as S receives
payment from his insurance company, in order to cover the costs of
cutting and shipping the new logs. B agrees to an extension of the
delivery date. However, a couple of weeks later, S informs B that a new
order of logs cannot be shipped, since a new law was passed in his home
country, which forbids loggers from cutting any trees that are the nesting
place for the White-Spotted Heron (which just happens to nest in those
particular trees). S immediately claims force majeure, due to S's
inability to perform.
50. See id., art. 153.
51. FECL, supra note 11, art. 24
52. See id.
53. See ZHENG, supra note 33, at 68-69; see also General Principles, supra note
26, art. 111.
54. This is the case when the contract is silent on the passage of risk terms. See,
Ross, supra note 1, at 144-45. However, Article 13 of the FECL allows parties to
stipulate passage of risk clauses in the contract. See FECL, supra note 11, art. 13.
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This example poses an intriguing problem for a Western party. China
does not have risk of loss provisions in its contract law. However, under
general Chinese practice, the seller maintains the risk of loss until the
goods are delivered at the buyer's place of business. Therefore, the
seller should have carriage insurance on his goods. For the purpose of
this paper, imagine if seller knew of this practice and built the cost of the
insurance into the contract price of the goods. Therefore, under the
FECL, the issues at hand are whether the new government regulation
would be declared a force majeure event and whether the seller is
required to continue performance even with the force majeure
impediment.
Would the new government regulation be declared a force majeure
event? A Chinese court may reason that once the cargo was lost at sea
and that loss met the three-prong analysis of the General Principles, a
force majeure impediment occurred.55  Since the regulation was
unforeseeable (there was no forewarning of the regulation in the media
or through normal channels of business at the time of contracting),
unavoidable (S could not have shipped substitute logs per the contract),
or could not be overcome (again by the inability to ship substitute logs),
the government regulation would likely be found to be a force majeure
impediment.
Upon reading Article 24,56 one could argue that S must continue with
the contract as soon as reasonably possible (by ordering the logs from
another foreign country that does not have such a restriction on the
harvest of that particular tree). This argument is based on the fact that B
relied on S's performance to his detriment and should not be forced to
cover his losses. Article 111 of the General Principles supports this
argument by granting the performing party the right to demand
performance when the other party has failed to perform.57 Article 111
provides in pertinent part, "[i]f one party fails to fulfill its contractual
55. See General Principles, supra note 26, art. 153. It is unlikely that a Western
party would argue a force majeure impediment for the loss of cargo, since most Western
nations do not accept a maritime or transit disaster as a qualifying impediment for a force
majeure defense, hence the reason for risk of loss provisions in most Western contract
laws. See U.C.C. § 2-509 (Risk of Loss in Absence of Breach); CISG, supra note 14,
art. 79; see also Wanki Lee, Exemptions of Contract Liability under the 1980 United
Nations Convention, 8 DICK. J. IN'L L. 375, 386 (1990).
56. FECL, supra note 11, art. 24. Article 24 provides in pertinent part, "[a]
party.. .should be relieved of the liability for late performance for the period during
which the consequence of the force majeure is being felt." Id.
57. General Principles, supra note 26, art. 111.
obligations or if the performance of such obligations fails to comply
with the agreed conditions, the other party shall have the right to demand
performance or take remedial measures and shall also have the right to
claim damages."58
To further compound this problem, the FECL leaves some ambiguity,
as to whether the party not invoking force majeure has the obligation to
accept delayed performance or if he has complete discretion to reject the
performance. Article 29(3) states: "A party is entitled to inform the
other party to cancel the contract.. .when the contract cannot be
performed due to the occurrence of force majeure."59 A strict reading of
Article 29(3) seems to give the impeded party a legal right to simply
inform the injured party that they may not be able to perform under the
contract, but only if the impediment completely prevents the party from
performing all of his obligations.:°
There are no specific provisions within the FECL that grant an injured
party the ability to unilaterally rescind the contract if the other party is
unable to perform.6 The only provision of the FECL that allows a party
to terminate a contract is Article 31, which states: "A contract is
terminated if any of the following situations occur: 1) when the contract
has been performed in accordance with the conditions stipulated in it; 2)
when the arbitration tribunal or the court decides to terminate the
contract; 3) when termination is agreed upon by both parties through
consultations.62
Article 31 would likely involve a situation were injured party refuses
to terminate the obligation to perform under the contract by relying on
the impeded party to perform. However, parties are free to negotiate
clauses stating a required window of performance. Then, if a party is
unable to perform within that specified window, then the other party
may rescind or terminate the contract. For example, one could look at
Chinese model contracts, which generally allow parties to cancel the
contract if the event lasts more than eight (8) weeks.'
2. Article 25 of the Foreign Economic Contract Law (FECL)
Article 25 of the FECL continues in the same vein of ambiguity as
58. Id.
59. FECL, supra note 11, art. 29(3).
60. See General Principles, supra note 26, art. 153.
61. See FECL, supra note 11, art. 29(3).
62. Id. art. 31.
63. Id. art. 31.
64. See China National Cereals, Oil & Foodstuffs Import and Export Corp.
Shanghai Cereals & Oil Branch. Confirmation of Order, in CHINA TRADE AGREEMENT,
at 214-16 (C. W. Chiu ed., 1985).
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Article 24. Article 25 requires that a party claiming a force majeure
defense must promptly notify the other party in order to mitigate losses.65
How much time does a non-performing party have to give the required
notice? One source of interpretation is Article 79(4) of the CISG, which
delineates a reasonable time standard for notification.66 However, the
notice required in the FECL could differ dramatically from the
reasonable time standard of he CISG, and thus, create sufficiently
different outcomes.
Article 25 of the FECL recommends that the party claiming force
majeure should provide a "certificate" issued from the "relevant
agencies" within a reasonable time period.67 The events surrounding the
Tian'anmen Square incident in 1989, provide an illustration of what may
qualify as a "certificate." Immediately after the incident, foreign
companies began to withdraw from China, claiming a force majeure
impediment because of the sudden and violent crackdown on student
protesters. In order to comply with Article 25 of the FECL, many
companies went to their respective embassies or business councils to get
certification that there was a force majeure event in progress. Embassy
certification might meet the certification requirement of Article 25 due
• 61
to a foreign government's evacuation advisory of its nationals.
65. FECL, supra note 11, art. 25. This provision is also repeated in Article 29(3),
referring to notification upon cancellation of a contract. Id. art. 29(3).
66. The term "reasonable time," as used in Article 79 of the CISG, has been a
thoroughly argued point, ruled upon by numerous courts and is a widely held (and
generally understood) term within the Western world. See Lee, supra note 55, at 391-92;
see also Amy H. Kastely, Unification and Community: A Rhetorical Analysis of the
United Nations Sales Convention, Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 574, 596 (1988).
67. Id.
68. Ross, supra note 1, at 68-69. Further adding to the withdrawal, many Western
governments ordered or recommended that citizens of their respective nations
immediately leave Mainland China. See id.
69. See Ross, supra note 1, at 82. Such a government-ordered evacuation was in
effect for many citizens of some Western nations. However, Chinese courts have not yet
heard or ruled as to whether or not the courts will recognize such certification as being
acceptable. Keep in mind that there is no indication whether or not a Chinese tribunal
hearing a force majeure case would accept certification by a non-Chinese agency
regarding an event that took place in China. Many of these cases have been ruled on by
the appropriate Chinese courts, but the courts' refusal to publish orders and rulings has
make it very difficult to ascertain how the Chinese courts would rule on this matter.
B. Recovery of Damages
Article 34 permits a party to maintain a claim for damages.7° Since
Article 24 exempts liability from a non-performing party for a force
majeure impediment, a question arises as to what is left to be recovered
as damages. To answer this question, the General Principles provide in
Article 134 that liability would involve returning the (lost or held)
property, restoring one to original condition or state, and compensating
for damages.7' These damages can include any amount of deposit paid
as a guaranty, insurance proceeds for lost goods, and any other
reasonable amounts incurred in anticipation of performance.72 For
example, if a buyer has prepaid according to the contract and the seller is
unable to deliver due to a force majeure event, the buyer is able to
maintain an action against the seller for the amount that he had prepaid
as a guaranty deposit. Including such a provision, as Article 134,
protects a party from any loss that he may incur from performing his
duties as contracted merely because the other party is unable to complete
his performance due to an impediment.73
When a foreign party intends to enter into a contract with a Chinese
party, it would greatly behoove him to thoroughly research and study not
only the relevant contract law,74 but also the actual practice and
application of these laws in the Chinese courts. As one can see from the
above analysis, Chinese contract provisions regarding a force majeure
70. FECL, supra note I1, art. 34. Article 34 of the FECL states: "Modification,
cancellation or termination of a contract does not deprive a party of the right to claim for
damages." A common law jurisdiction would refer to this right as the "right for
restitution." See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 18, at 910; see also CISG, supra
note 14, art. 74; Tim Logan, The People's Republic of China and the United Nations
Convention on Contracts for the International Sales of Goods: Formation Questions, 5
CHINA L. REP. 53, 59 (1988).
71. General Principles, supra note 26, art. 134(iv)-(vii).
72. See id. art. 134 (v), (vii), (ix).
73. To allow a seller to keep a payment made in advance when he is unable to
deliver the goods due to a force majeure, event would result in unjust enrichment of the
seller. Likewise, when a buyer has received the contracted goods, yet is unable to make
payment due to a qualifying impediment, the buyer should not be able to maintain title
and possession of the goods at the seller's expense. Compare CISG, supra note 14, art.
81(2) (restitution) with FECL, supra note 11, and New Contract Law of the People's
Republic of China (China Legal System Publishing House) (1999) (The FECL and the
NCL do not have similar provisions, that provide for restitution, as the CISG does.)
[hereinafter NCL].
74. Some of the relevant contract law provisions in China are found in the Foreign
Economic Contract Law (FECL), Economic Contract Law (ECL), Law on Technology
of Contracts (LTC), Chinese-Foreign Contractual Joint Venture Law, Chinese-Foreign
Equity Joint Venture Law and the Foreign Capital Enterprises Law, reprinted in Chung-
hua jen min kung ho kuo she wai fa kuei hui pien, supra note 48, at 484 (1991).
However, keep in mind that the ECL, LTC, and the FECL have been repealed and now
fall under the guise of the NCL. NCL, supra note 73, art. 428.
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event are rather ambiguous at best.
Keep in mind that when a foreign party enters into a contract with a
Chinese party, the CISG, as well as the FECL can also apply to the
contract. However, the CISG will modify or replace Chinese law only
when the contract is between parties of which both have their place of
business in a signatory State to the CISG.75 Whereas, the FECL will be
the ruling body of law if only one party is considered to have their place
of business in a Contracting State to the CISG.76 But when the rules of
private international law require the application of Chinese law, the
CISG will not be considered, since China declared itself not be bound by
Article l(1)(b) of the CISG.77 Thus, it is more likely that Chinese law
will be applied without the CISG in Sino-foreign transactions."8
Nonetheless, a majority of the largest trading partners in the world are
signatories to the CISG.79 Therefore, it is very important to understand
the force majeure provisions of the CISG.
IV. THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG)
The CISG was adopted on April 11, 1980 after five long weeks of
intensive deliberations in Vienna, Austria which cumulated after tens
years of work by the United Nations Commission on International Trade
75. CISG, supra note 14, art. 1; see also Jianming Shen, The Remedy of Requiring
Performance Under the CISG and the Relevance of Domestic Rules, 13 ARIZ. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 253, 259 (1996).
76. See Shen, supra note 75, at 259.
77. See CISG, supra note 14, art. l(1)(b). Article l(1)(b) of the CISG states: "This
Convention applies to contracts of sale of goods between parties whose places of
business are in different States... when the rules of private international law lead to the
application of the law of a Contracting State." Id. Upon ratification of the CISG, China
declared that "[t]he People's Republic of China does not consider itself to be bound by
subparagraph (b) of paragraph (1) of Article 1 [of the CISG]." See 1987 ZHONGGUO
FALU NIANJIAN 540 (Chinese Annual of Law) (1987); 5 CHIN LAW AND PRACTICE 25, 49
(May 1987); JOHN HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE UNIFORM LAW FOR
INTERNATIONAL SALES: THE STUDIES, DELIBERATIONS AND DECISIONS THAT LED TO THE
1980 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION WITH INTRODUCTIONS AND EXPLANATIONS 766-78
(1989) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY]; see also Shen, supra note 75, at 260, 260
n.17. The United States has also made a similar declaration as to Article l(1)(b). Id.
78. See Shen, supra note 75, at 258.
79. As of April 4, 2001 the United Nations Treaty Section reports that 58 states
have adopted the CISG. See U.N. Treaty Collection Web Cite, available at
http://untreaty.un.org/English/treaty.asp. Contracting States to the CISG, cover the vast
majority of the major trading partners of the world. See id.
Law (UNCITRAL). ° The purpose of the CISG was to promote
international trade and to fulfill a quest for uniformity of international
contract law.' The CISG is far more expansive in its scope than the
FECL.82 Specifically, the CISG, in comparison to the FECL, contains no
provisions requiring certification of force majeure events, adheres to a
broader doctrine of excuse," and contains substantial provisions on the
passage of risk."
A. Force Majeure Provisions
1. Article 79 of the CISG
Although some of the language of Article 79 of the CISG is similar to
Article 24 of the FECL, the application of the CISG is much broader.
One of the drafters of the CISG, John Honnold, states that the principle
elements of Article 79 in paragraph (1) are that the non-performing party
is not "liable for failure to perform" when: (a) the failure was "due to an
impediment beyond his control;"8 (b) at the time of the contract, the
party "could not reasonably be expected to have taken the impediment
into account;8 6 and (c) subsequent to the contract, the party could not
reasonably be expected to "have avoided or overcome [the obstacle] or
its consequences.""
Article 79 of the CISG lays out a similar test to the tree-prong test
used under the General Principles, when applying the FECL, to a force
majeure event. Both the CISG and the FECL require the non-
performing party to show that the event was unforeseeable, unavoidable,
and insurmountable.8 Both also require that a non-performing party
provide notice to the other party, within a reasonable time, once the
impediment and its effects on performance become known or should
have become known.88 However, as mentioned earlier, the CISG does
not require the non-performing party to obtain certification of the event
from any relevant agency? The CISG only requires a showing of proof
80. See CISG, supra note 14; see also Jacob S. Ziegal & Claude Samson, Report
to the Uniform Law Conference of Canada on Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods, at 1 (1981), available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/
wais/db/articles/english2.html.
81. See id.
82. See Shen, supra note 75, at 257-58.
83. See Ross, supra note 1, at 88.
84. Compare CISG, supra note 14 art. 79, with FECL, supra note 11, arts. 24-25.
85. See HONNOLD, supra note 77, at 531.
86. See id.
87. Id.
88. See CISG, supra note II, art. 79; General Principles, supra note 26, art. 153.
89. See id. art. 79(4).
90. See FECL, supra note 11, art. 25. The FECL does require certification.
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that an impediment occurred, which prevented performance.9'
Article 79(3) of the CISG does not state a bright-line standard for how
long an impediment must exist before a party is excused from
performance. Article 79(3) states: "[t]he exemption provided by this
article has effect for the period during which the impediment exists."9
Under general Chinese practice, Article 24 of the FECL requires the
non-performing party to resume his performance if the impediment lasts
less than ten weeks.93  Article 79(3) does not seem to make such a
distinction as to when non-performance is excused under the contract. 94
Once a force majeure impediment has taken place, the non-performing
party is only excused from his "liability" for failure to perform (i.e.
damages).9' The contract continues to exist unless and until it is
• 6
avoided. Therefore, Article 79 leaves one to wonder exactly when, and
under what conditions, the non-performing party is released from
performing the contract.97
Unlike the general practice in China, which allows for cancellation of
contracts for events lasting over ten weeks, 9 it appears that the drafters
of the CISG did not want to put a bright-line time limit on the ability of
the performing party to avoid the contract. Under the CISG, the
performing party can avoid the contract when the non-performing
party's inability or delay in their performance rises to the level of a
fundamental breach.99 For example, if the buyer cannot pay the seller
due to a new exchange restriction, or if the seller cannot deliver due to a
sudden change in export controls, the non-performing party in each case
91. See CISG, supra note 14, art. 79(3).
92. See id.
93. See FECL, supra note 11, art. 24.
94. See CISG, supra note 14, art. 79(3).
95. Id. at art. 79(1); see also Jennifer M. Bund, Force Majeure Clauses: Drafting
Advice for the CISG Practitioner, 17 J.L. & Com. 381, 387 (1998).
96. Ziegel, supra note 80, at note 3, (commenting on Article 79(1)).
97. CISG, supra note 14, art. 79(5). Article 79(5) of the CISG does not take any
rights from the performing party other than the right to claim damages ("Nothing in this
article prevents either party from exercising any right other than to claim damages under
this Convention." (emphasis added)). For example, if there were a delay in delivery
caused by a two-month-long government-ordered blockade, the buyer would still have
the option to avoid the contract if the delay constituted a "fundamental breach." Id. art
25. ("A breach of contract committed by one of the parties is fundamental if it results in
such detriment to the other party as substantially to deprive him of what he is entitled to
expect under the contract..").
98. Id.
99. CISG, supra note 14, art. 83.
would not be liable for damages.'0 However, the party who has
performed without receiving the agreed return is entitled to redress.''
This redress is provided by the "right of avoidance,"' '° which carries
with it the right to "restitution" for whatever the party "has supplied or
paid under the contract."'0 3
2. Breach by a Third Party
It is quite common for a contract to include acts of performance by a
third party. What happens when a force majeure event impedes a third
party from performing? Article 79(2) of the CISG provides a two-prong
test to determine whether or not the contracting parties will be held
liable for the failure to perform by the third party. °'" First, the
contracting party claiming inability to perform due to an impediment of
a third party must prove that he would be exempt from any liability
under a force majeure defense.' 5 In other words, if the contracting party
would be unable to perform, due to a direct impediment, he has passed
the first prong.'°6 Second, the contracting party must prove that the third
party would be exempt under a force majeure defense.' 7 Take, for
example, a seller who is unable to perform his obligation of delivery if
his third party supplier is unable to provide the supplies he needs to
complete the buyer's request. Under the two-prongs of Article 79(2),
the seller would not be able to claim force majeure, unless the
impediment stopping the third party from performing also applies to
him. This could apply if there was a governmental restriction on those
supplies, war, or a civil strife that affects both the third party and the
contracting party.
A breach by a third party is another area were the CISG provides
guidance, while the FECL does not. Under the FECL, a party may be
100. See id. art. 79(1).
101. See id. art. 81(2).
102. Id. art. 79(5). Article 81(2) of the CISG allows a party who has performed the
contract, either wholly or in part, to claim restitution from the other party for any
damages suffered from the other party's inability to perform due to a force majeure
event. Id. art. 81(2).
103. HONNOLD, supra note 77, at 551.
104. CISG, supra note 14, art. 79(2).
105. See id. art. 79(2)(a).
106. See id. art. 79. Article 79 of the CISG requires a party to be unable to perform
personally in order to pass the first prong of the test. Id. A party who is unable to
perform, in part from a third party's inability to perform, cannot claim force majeure.
See id. For example, a seller who is unable to deliver the ordered goods because the
necessary parts could not be shipped by a third party will be unable to claim force
majeure, since the seller could buy the necessary parts from a different third party. See
id. art. 79(2).
107. See id. art. 79(2).
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able to claim force majeure due to an impediment of a third party,
provided that the party claiming force majeure is able to pass the
FECL's three-prong test."8 If the third party's impediment can be
proven from the contract party's standpoint as passing the three-prong
test, then the impediment should be considered a force majeure event,
thus allowing the contract to be terminated. °9 With the lack of guidance
by the FECL, such an event may satisfy the three-prong test even if the
impediment would not apply to or completely stops the contract party
from performing.
B. Recovery of Damages
The right of avoidance and the corresponding right to restitution
provide a means to gauge how long a party must wait before making
alternative arrangements, in order to fulfill their contractual desires.
Article 81(2) of the CISG allows an injured party to claim damages in
the amount, if any, that were prepaid or supplied to the impeded party."1
0
Although Article 79(1) provides a liability exemption to an impeded
party for their inability to perform, Article 81(2) stipulates that the
impeded party is still required to reimburse the injured party for any
payments or goods delivered prior to the occurrence of the
impediment."' A party that has performed, or partially performed,
should not be penalized for the non-performance of another party due to
a force majeure event.
C. Passage of Risk
Unlike the National People's Congress of the PRC, UNCITRAL
decided to include passage of risk provisions in the CISG. The passage
of risk provisions give a legal basis for parties to decide exactly who
carries the risk of loss and when that risk shifts to the other party. The
main passage of risk provision, Article 67(1), states:
108. See General Principles, supra note 26, art. 153. The tree-prong test for
establishing force majeure, is whether the impediment was unforeseeable, unavoidable,
and unable to be overcome. Id.
109. See id.; see also FECL, supra note 11, art. 24.
110. CISG, supra note 14, art. 81(2).
111. Id.
If the contract of sale involves carriage of the goods and the seller is not bound
to hand them over at a particular place, the risk passes to the buyer when the
goods are handed over to the first carrier for transmission to the buyer in
accordance with the contract of sale. If the seller is bound to hand the goods
over to a carrier at a particular place, the risk does not pass to the buyer until the
goods are handed over to the carrier at that place."
2
The CISG sets a standard when the risk of loss shifts from one party to
another.' 3  However, as noted earlier, Chinese contract law does not
contain any risk of loss provisions."4 There are several reasons for this.
First, it has been a long standing Chinese practice (both domestic and
international), that the seller maintains the risk until the goods are
delivered to the buyer's place of business."5 A foreign seller must not
only cover the risk for the transoceanic carriage, but also for the
domestic carriage within China. Second, the national trucking, shipping,
and rail line industries of China are controlled by the government.
Therefore, various choices of delivery are not available to a seller in
China. A foreign or domestic party can overcome this lack of choices in
delivery simply by adding the cost of insurance into the contract price.
The theory of passage of risk is consistent with the contractual norm
of leaving the parties at status quo when a contract becomes terminated
due to a force majeure event. Article 66 of CISG which states: "Loss of
or damage to the goods after the risk has passed to the buyer does not
discharge him from his obligation to pay the price, unless the loss or
damage is due to an act or omission of the seller."' 16 The inclusion of the
passage of risk provisions in the CISG provides some level of
predictability to parties in case a force majeure event takes place when
goods are in transit.
The CISG appears to be far more expansive than China's FECL when
it comes to the force majeure provisions."7  Article 79 of the CISG
outlines the general rules and principles of what constitutes a force
majeure event and what the parties involved should do to mitigate the
loss.8  Article 81(2) of the CISG provides protection for the injured
112. Id. at art. 67(1).
113. This is an important and often overlooked provision in an international
contract with a Chinese party. See Nung Fu, Remedies Under Chinese Contract Law, 2
INT'L LEGAL PERSP. 1, 7 (1990).
114. See generally FECL, supra note 11; ECL, supra note 12.
115. See Zuigao Rennin Fayuan Guanyu Shiyong Rougan Wenti de Jieda (The
Supreme People's Response to Several Questions Concerning the Application of the
Foreign Economic Contracts Law), issued Oct. 19, 1987, 4 S.P.C.T. Bull. 3 (1987).
116. CISG, supra note 14, art. 66.
117. See generally CISG, supra note 14, art. 79; FECL, supra note 11, arts. 24-25;
see also Shen, supra, note 75, at 257-58.
118. CISG, supra note 14, art. 79.
[VOL. 2: 173, 2001] Force Majeure
SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J..
party and insures that one of the parties will not be unjustly enriched." 9
The passage of risk provisions in Articles 66 and 67 of the CISG lend
some predictability as to which party is liable for any loss or damage to
the goods while in transit.
20
However, the CISG is far from providing a completely cohesive and
uniform set of regulations for a force majeure event. Honnold stated
"[i]n spite of strenuous efforts of legislators and scholars... [it is very
likely] that Article 79 may be the Convention's least successful part of
the half century of work towards international uniformity."' 2'
V. THE APPLICATION OF THE CISG IN CHINA UNDER THE FECL
A party wishing to familiarize itself with the application of the CISG,
in China, faces a daunting task. There are two main reasons for this.
First, the PRC has reserved Article l(1)(b) of the CISG. 2 1 If such a
reservation had not been made, Article 1(1)(b) would allow China to use
the CISG as their national law in lieu of the FECL for an issue arising
under the CISG. However, since the PRC has reserved that article, the
CISG will not be applied as the governing law. In lieu of the CISG, the
PRC would use the FECL, or since October 1, 1999, the Contract Law
of the PRC as the governing law. Second, the Chinese courts do not
publish their opinions. The idea of stare decisis is not a developed legal
doctrine within the PRC, therefore, a court opinion is not of any value in
the Chinese legal system.'24 For this reason, a researcher will not be able
119. Id. at art. 81(2).
120. Id. at arts. 66-67.
121. See HONNOLD, supra note 77, at 543.
122. CISG, supra note 14, art. 79(5). Article I(1)(b) of the CISG states: "this
Convention applies to contracts of sale of goods between parties whose places of
business are in different States.. .when the rules of private international law lead to the
application of the law of a Contracting State." Id. art I(1)(b). Upon ratification of the
CISG, China declared that "[tihe People's Republic of China does not consider itself to
be bound by subparagraph (b) of paragraph (1) of Article I [of the CISG]." See
NIANJIAN, supra note 9, at 540. The United States has also made a similar declaration
as to Article I(1)(b). Id.
123. See id. Article I(1)(b) of the CISG only comes into play when one of the
parties is from a non-signatory state to the CISG and the other party is from a signatory
state. See id. art I(1)(b). For further reading on this topic, see Ziegal, supra note 80; see
also GRANT R. ACKERMAN, U.N. CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL
SALE OF GOODS (1992).
124. Again, the Chinese legal system does not utilize any type of reporter series of
case opinions that is prevalent in the United States common law system. See Yan, supra
note 40, at 28-29.
to find prior case law within the PRC on how Chinese courts have
handled issues that arose under the CISG. Therefore, a look at how the
FECL might be applied will shed light on how the NCL will be applied
in the future.
In order to understand how the CISG and the FECL work, consider the
two hypothetical cases below. The first hypothetical deals with two parties
that are each from a signatory nation of the CISG. The second hypothetical
deals with a party that is not from a signatory nation of the CISG.'25
A. Hypothetical Case Number One
(1) FACTS: Seller and buyer enter into a contract for the sale of
100,000 pounds of raw iron ore for $900,000 payable in U.S. dollars.
Seller is a citizen of and operates out of the United States. Buyer is a
citizen of and operates out of China. The contract calls for buyer to
place a guaranty deposit in the amount of $300,000 (1/3 of the contract
price), in advance via a letter of credit in seller's name, within two
weeks after the contract is signed. Shortly before the two-week
expiration date, seller receives buyer's letter of credit, immediately
cashes it, and begins to process the 100,000 pounds of iron ore for buyer.
Two weeks later, seller places the 100,000 pounds of iron ore into ship
containers and places them aboard a Panamanian-flagged ship bound for
Sydney, Australia for delivery of unrelated cargo and then for Shanghai,
PRC. Shortly after arrival in Sydney, Australian authorities seize and
impound the cargo of iron ore under a recently passed embargo against
China of all natural raw materials (the embargo was quickly passed in
retaliation of the arrest of several Australian tourists for smuggling
within China). Seller immediately files an injunction against the
Australian customs agency claiming that the embargo should not apply
to the iron ore since it did not originate in Australia and the ship was
only temporarily in Australian waters for delivery of other cargo. The
Australian court denies the injunction stating that the raw material is in
Australian waters, docked at an Australian dock, and is currently being
protected under Australian law. Therefore, any and all cargo aboard the
ship (including the current embargo of raw materials to China), falls
under Australian law. Two days later, the United States, Canada, Great
Britain, France, and Germany all join Australia in the embargo against
China. Seller immediately notifies buyer of the Australian embargo and
seller's inability to perform.
125. Neither of these hypothetical cases or facts are based on real cases.
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ISSUE: Buyer files suit with the China International Economic and
Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC),'26 under Article 2 of the
Arbitration Rules of CIETAC,1 7 against seller, for return of his 1/3
deposit. Seller files a countersuit for payment of the remaining
$600,000 price of the iron ore.
HOLDING: CIETAC would apply the rules of the CISG since both
the United States and China are signatory nations to the Convention.
The embargo of the goods would be classified as a force majeure event
under Article 79(1) of the CISG, since the Australian embargo was
unforeseeable, unavoidable, and not able to be overcome by seller.'28
Much like the Chinese FECL, the CISG requires a three-prong test to be
satisfied in order for an impediment to be declared a force majeure
event. '29 (1) Unforeseeable - Under the CISG, seller could not be
expected to foresee a sudden, politically inspired embargo of raw
materials to China. The fact that Australia and China are having
political disputes was not an issue when neither the time the contract
between seller and buyer was formed nor the time seller placed his
goods onboard the Australian-bound freighter. When seller and buyer
concluded the contract and placed the goods with the carrier, there was
no indication that Australia would impose a broad embargo against
China and include any foreign-originated materials that happened to
temporarily stop in Australian territory within the scope of the embargo.
(2) Unavoidable - The embargo was unavoidable since it took effect the
morning that the ore carrier arrived in Australia and was immediately
seized by the Australian authorities. Since that time, several other
countries, including the United States (the home country of seller), also
imposed the same restrictions on exporting raw materials to China. (3)
Insurmountable - Seller attempted to overcome the impediment by filing
an injunction against the embargo and lost. Further adding to seller's
126. China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC)
Arbitration Rules, available at www.cietac-sz.cn/cietac/index-e.htm (revised and
adopted by the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade/China Chamber
of International Commerce on September 5, 2000. Effective as of October 1, 2000.)
[hereinafter CIETAC]. CIETAC is the official arbitration board of the PRC and is
certified and recognized to provide arbitration for both domestic and international cases.
Id. art. 2. Article 2 provides that CIETAC has the authority to resolve any dispute
arising from economic and trade transactions of a contractual or non-contractual nature.
Id.
127. Id.
128. CISG, supra note 14, art. 79(1).
129. Id. art 79; see also General Principles, supra note 26, art. 153.
inability to overcome the impediment, the United States along with the
other major producers of raw iron ore joined in the embargo, completely
cutting off seller's ability to ship any future shipments of iron ore to
China. This is not to mention the fact that most maritime carriers were
refusing to load raw materials onboard any of their ships destined for
China due to this embargo and the possibility that their ships might be
held in port for the duration of the embargo like the Panamanian ship in
Australia. Therefore, seller would not be liable to buyer for his inability
to perform since he meets the three-prong test of Article 79(1) of the
CISG. On buyer's demand for return of his $300,000 Letter of Credit,
CIETAC would hold that Article 81(2) requires that seller return the
deposit of $300,000 to buyer.' 30 Since buyer wholly performed per the
requirements of the contract up to the time of the impediment, buyer
falls under the guise of Article 81(2) which allows for restitution of any
amount that he had paid to S in advance. As to seller's counterclaim for
the remaining $600,000 of the payment price, CIETAC would review
the passage of risk provisions to determine which party held the risk of
the cargo loss at the time of the actual loss. Since there was no passage
of risk clause in the contract, CIETAC would apply the rules set forth in
Article 67(1) of the CISG."' Article 67(1) states that in the absence of a
contracted passage of risk clause, the risk of loss passes from seller to
buyer once the goods are handed over to the first carrier for transmission
or delivery.32 Therefore, buyer held the risk of loss once seller placed
the iron ore into the ship containers and placed them aboard the
Panamanian ship. Buyer was expected under the CISG to have placed
carriage insurance over the goods in transit.'33 If Australia will not
release the ship and goods back to seller, then buyer would still be
considered liable for the goods since the goods were "lost" during
transit. Thus, buyer is liable to seller for the price of the goods.
In conclusion, CIETAC would hold that the embargo by the various
countries, including Australia and the United States, and the subsequent
seizure of the goods under the embargo by the Australian authorities,
130. Id. Article 81(2) provides in pertinent part: "A party who has performed the
contract either wholly or in part may claim restitution from the other party of whatever
the first party has supplied or paid under the contract." Id. art. 81(2).
131. CISG, supra note 14, art. 67(1); see generally, CIETAC Arbitration Rules,
supra note 126.
132. CISG, supra note 14, art. 67(1).
133. In lieu of filing suit against buyer for the payment price, seller could demand
that the Australian authorities release the goods for shipment back to the United States(who is not affected under the embargo). Therefore, seller would still have the goods
and would be able to then sell the iron ore to other parties of countries not affected by the
embargo. If the Australian authorities would not release the ore due to a fear that the
ship might, once out of Australian waters, head for China, seller would probably file suit
for the payment price.
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would qualify as a force majeure event under the three-prong test of the
CISG. Seller must return the $300,000 deposit to buyer under Article
81(2) since buyer performed as per the contract and seller would be
unjustly enriched if allowed to keep the guaranty deposit. Furthermore,
buyer must pay $900,000 to seller for the loss of the goods under Article
67(1) if the Australian authorities will not release the goods back to
seller.
B. Hypothetical Case Number Two
(2) FACTS: The facts are the same as in hypothetical (1) except that
seller is from Panama instead of the United States.
HOLDING: CIETAC would apply Chinese law under their
reservation of Article l(1)(b) of the CISG 34 since seller is from a non-
signatory nation while buyer is a citizen of China, a signatory nation to
the CISG. Upon review of the facts, CIETAC would again hold that the
seizure and impounding of the contract goods by the Australian
government as being unforeseeable, unavoidable, and unable to be
overcome per Article 24 of the FECL35 and Article 153 of the General
Principles of China, and therefore, classify as a force majeure event.'36
The reasons that the embargo and seizure of the goods are declared to be
unforeseeable, unavoidable, and not able to be overcome are the same as
described in hypothetical (1). As to buyer's contention for restitution,
CIETAC would more than likely again hold in favor of the buyer.
Article 34 of the FECL provides that any contract that is terminated shall
not infringe upon a party's ability to collect damages. In this case, it
would unjustly enrich seller to hold the deposit of buyer when seller was
unable to perform. This is similar to the general theory of damages in
contract actions; a party should not be unjustly enriched at the expense
of the other party. The countersuit by buyer is a slightly more complex
issue. Within the FECL, there are no passage of risk provisions. As the
facts stipulate, there was no clause in the contract stating any passage of
risk rules. In the absence of any set law, regulations, or contractual
clauses, under Articles 38 and 39 of the Arbitration Rules,'37 CIETAC
134. CISG, supra note 14, art. l(l)(b); see also General Principles, supra note 26,
art. 142, which states that "an international treaty shall prevail over Chinese law with the
exception of those articles to which the PRC has declared reservation."
135. FECL, supra note 11, art. 24.
136. General Principles, supra note 26, art. 153.
137. CIETAC, supra note 126, arts. 38-39. Articles 38 and 39 combined, give
can gather evidence and call experts and officials to help clarify the law
and any issues present before them. In this instance, CIETAC may look
towards general Chinese contract practice and call any experts on the
practice of international sales contract under Chinese law. If that is the
case, CIETAC will likely hold that seller was liable for the loss of the
cargo, since Chinese practice is that the seller maintains the risk of loss
until the goods reach the buyer's place of business. Since the "loss" of
cargo took place while the goods were still in transit, Seller would still
be liable for the loss of goods. Therefore, seller's countersuit for the
remaining $600,000 of the contracted price will fail. Furthermore, under
Article 111 of the General Principles, the court may allow the
performing party to continue to demand performance.'38 This would
allow buyer to require that seller purchase the iron ore from a third party
in a country that is not imposing a raw material embargo on China and
then re-ship the goods as per stated in the contract.
In conclusion, CIETAC would hold that the embargo and seizure by
Australia would qualify as a force majeure impediment since the actions
of the governments were unforeseeable, avoidable, or able to be
overcome by seller. Buyer will be entitled to the return of his $300,000
deposit under Article 34 and seller (or seller's insurance company if
seller is insured) will be liable for the price of the lost goods.
Additionally, buyer could continue to demand performance for the
contract once the impediment disappears or require that seller find
alternative means to ship the goods.
As one can see from the above hypotheticals and the resulting
analysis, the application of the FECL versus the CISG can result in
greatly opposing rulings. For a party intending to enter into contracts
with a Chinese party, especially for parties from non-signatory nations to
the CISG, it is best to negotiate a well constructed and thorough force
majeure provision that outlines a general listing of events that shall be
considered force majeure events (to protect from the Chinese court's
arbitrary holdings of what is a qualifying impediment and what is not),
provide grounds for restitution, and establish passage of risk rules.
Although including such provisions will not guarantee that the Chinese
court will not continue to arbitrarily apply their own line of reasoning, it
will help to provide more comfort and predictability for the contracting
parties. Article 8 of the FECL states that appendices to a contract will
help to govern the contract.'39 A party, therefore, could simply point to
CIETAC arbitrators the power to conduct their own investigations and call whatever
witnesses they deem necessary to aid in their decision. Id.
138. General Principles, supra note 26, art. I 11.
139. FECL, supra note 1I, art. 8. Article 8 states that "[a]ppendices specified in a
contract are integral parts of the contract." Id.
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Article 8 and inform the court that they must allow the clause or
appendices to stand since the clause shows the parties intent and helps to
clarify the parties' contract and performance obligations. In addition, a
party can stipulate that the contract will be governed by the CISG,
regardless of whether both countries are signatory nations to the CISG
under Article 5 of the FECL." Negotiating a well-constructed and
thorough force majeure clause (if possible) is the best way for parties to
provide some predictability and uniformity in their contract.
VI. NEW CONTRACT LAW (NCL) OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
In 1993, the Judicial Committee of the People's Republic of China
began work on drafting a new uniform contract law that would
supersede the three current sets of contract laws. 4' As stated by one of
the drafters, "[a] contract law that is applicable to all areas [of
contracting] will better serve the homogeneous market" under China's
new market economy policies. 42 China is currently in the middle of a
transition period of moving from a planned economy to an open market
economy.' 3 Therefore, any contract law must not only cover planned
contractual relationships under a market economy, but the current
relationships under a planned economy as well. With that in mind, the
purpose of the new contract law was to provide uniformity, freedom of
contract, creditors' interest, and functionalism.'"
On March 15, 1999, the Second Session of the Ninth National
People's Congress adopted the new Contract Law of the People's
Republic of China (NCL), and with its adoption the FECL was
repealed.141
For a foreign party with intentions of conducting contract negotiations
in China, the repeal of the FECL and enactment of the new Contract
140. Id. art. 5. Article 5 provides in pertinent part: "The parties to a contract may
choose the law to be applied to the settlement of the disputes arising from the
contract...." Id.
141. See Jiang, supra note 27, at 245.
142. Id. at 246.
143. See id. at 257.
144. See id. at 246.
145. NCL, supra note 73. Article 428 of the NCL states: "This Law shall come
into force as of October 1, 1999. The Economic Contract Law of the People's Republic
of China (ECL), the Law of the People's Republic of China on Economic Contracts
Involving Foreign Interests (FECL) and the Law of the People's Republic of China on
Technology Contracts (LTC) shall be invalidated simultaneously." Id.
Law may be a mixed blessing. In promulgating the NCL, the National
People's Congress have decided to stray away from China's standard
practice of enacting generalized and arbitrary codes that are difficult to
operate.1 6  The NCL is far more comprehensive and uniform.' 
47
However, the fact that China has enacted nearly ten times the number of
provisions in the NCL, than the FECL, does not necessarily mean that
the provisions provide more uniformity and predictability. Specifically,
the NCL maintain the FECL's broad stance on force majeure while
dropping some of the stiffening requirements that were found in the
FECL.1
4
A. Force Majeure Provisions
1. Articles 94 and 96 of the Contract Law of the
People's Republic of China
Articles 94 and 96 of the NCL pertain to rescission of a contract in the
event of force majeure. Article 94(1) states: "The parties to a contract
may rescind the contract [if]... [t]he purpose of the contract is not able
to be realized because of force majeure.', 49 Thus, Article 94(1) sets up
the basis for a party to rescind or revoke a contract for one's inability to
perform due to force majeure5°
Article 96 states: "One party to a contract shall make a notice to the
other party if it advances to rescind the contract according to the
provisions of... [a]rticle 94 of this Law."' 5 ' This provision requires the
party seeking to rescind the contract to promptly notify the other party.
Combined, Articles 94 and 96 provide a party with the ability to rescind
a contract, once a qualified impediment occurs, on the condition that the
146. See Jiang, supra note 27, at 254.
147. See id. at 257. Consider the fact that the ECL of 1981 has only 57 provisions,
the FECL has only 43 provisions, and the General Principles has 156 provisions with
only 10 of those provisions pertaining to contracts. See ECL, supra note 12; FECL,
supra note 11; General Principles, supra note 26. On the other hand, the NCL has 428
provisions, probably the largest number among China's current laws. See NCL, supra
note 73.
148. NCL, supra note 73. The NCL removed the certification requirement from the
appropriate Chinese authorities. Id. FECL gave the performing party the ability to
require performance from the party claiming a force majeure event, even though they are
unable to perform under the current circumstances. FECL, supra note 11. That is no
longer the case under Article 110(1) of the NCL which states that a party who fails to
perform a non-monetary requirement of the contract can still be required to perform
under the terms of the contract, except for a party who is unable to perform in law or in
fact. NCL, supra note 73, art. 110(1). Thus, once a party has proven an impediment
exists, the performing party can no longer demand further performance. See Id.
149. Id. art. 94(1).
150. Id.
151. Id. art. 96.
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rescinding party provide notice to the other party."'
2. Articles 117 and 118 of the Contract Law of the
People's Republic of China
Articles 117 and 118 of the NCL are the specific force majeure
provisions. Article 117 states:
In case that a contract is not able to be performed because of force majeure, the
liabilities shall be exempted in part or wholly in light of the effects of force
majeure, except as otherwise stipulated by law. If the force majeure occ%§
after one party has delayed in performance, the liability may not be exempted.
Thus, a party that is unable to perform due to force majeure can be
exempted from owing damages to the other party, either in whole or
part, depending on the amount of performance that he was able to
accomplish, if any, prior to force majeure. In addition, Article 117 will
not allow a party to be exempted from damage liability if the non-
performing party had already breached the contract prior to the
occurrence of force majeure.
Article 118 of the NCL, requires the non-performing party to give
notice of his inability to perform. Article 118 of the NCL states:
One party to a contract that is not able to perform the contract because of force
majeure shall make a notice to the other party promptly so as to reduce the
probable lossestp the other party and provide evidence within a reasonable
amount of time.
The language of Article 118 is similar to Article 94. Both provisions
require the non-performing party and/or the rescinding party to give
notice in a reasonable time, in order to mitigate damages. In
combination Articles 94 and 118, of the NCL, are more specific than
Article 25 of the FECL. The FECL's Article 25 only provided that the
non-performing party was required to give notice of his inability to
perform and the time limit set for such notice was vague and
undetermined.
5
152. Id. arts. 94, 96.
153. Id. art. 117.
154. Id. art. 118.
155. FECL, supra note 11, art. 25; Article 25 of the FECL only provided that the
non-performing party was required to give notice "in time to mitigate the loss which
might possibly occur to the other party...." Id. art. 25.
Article 118 sets the time limit for notice as a "reasonable time.' ' 56 The
delineated standard of Article 118 provides some guidance, as to how
much time a rescinding party has to give notice another party in a force
majeure event. 57 However, for an international party, this reasonable
time standard is a question of interpretation, and therefore, could vary in
application within China.
Article 118 of the NCL, differs from Article 25 of the FECL, in more
than one way. The Article 25 certification requirement from the proper
Chinese authority has been eliminated from the language of Article
118.158 The NCL only requires that "evidence" be provided to the
performing party within a reasonable time. 59 However, the inclusion of
the term "evidence" may still constitute certification from the proper
Chinese authority.'6 Unlike Article 25 of the FECL, which clearly states
that certification is required from the "relevant agency," Article 118 only
states that "evidence" is required of the intervening event.
6
3. Breach by a Third Party
The National People's Congress included provisions within the NCL
outlining whether or not a breach by a third party would allow a claim of
force majeure event.162 Article 121 states: "The party who breaches a
contract due to the reason of a third party shall be liable to the other
party for breaching the contract."'' 63  Thus, an impediment stopping a
third party from performing will not allow the affected contract party to
claim aforce majeure defense."
156. NCL, supra note 73, art. 118.
157. Id.
158. NCL, supra note 73, art. 118.
159. Id. Although there is no definition as to what constitutes evidence of the
intervening event, a reasonable translation of that provision is that any type of proper
documentation ... or other evidence that would prove an impediment occurred will be
accepted as evidence of the intervening event. See id. Documentation could be
certificates from banking authorities, of their inability to issue letters of credit, due to no
fault of the buyer; or from governmental authorities stating that a law or regulation has
changed causing the seller's inability to deliver; or from a recognized marine authority,
stating that the shipment was lost at sea, etc. See NCL, supra note 73, art. 118.
160. See id.
161. Id. This is similar to Article 79 of the CISG which requires a non-performing
party to "prove that the failure [to perform] was due to an impediment beyond his
control." CISG, supra note 14, art. 79(1).
162. See NCL, supra note 73, art. 121.
163. Id.
164. See id. If a contracted party is not able to claim force majeure since the
impediment only applies to the third party and not himself, he would be held liable for
breach of contract under both Article 121 and 79(2) of the CISG. On the other hand,
under Article 121 of the NCL, if the impediment does apply to the third party as well as
the contracted party, the contracted party would be able to claim force majeure since the
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The language of Article 121 of the NCL appears to be more restrictive
in contrast to Article 79(2) of the CISG. Article 79(2) of the CISG
allows a party to claim force majeure when a third party is impeded,
provided that the impediment applies to both the third party, as well as
the contracted party.
B. Recovery of Damages
In comparison with the repealed FECL, the NCL provides more
detailed damages provisions."6 As mentioned previously, parties
involved in a contract terminated for force majeure reasons may still
have damages to contend with.'66 Article 115 of the NCL provides the
damage provision that would concern a party involved in an impediment
dispute." Article 115 defines the Chinese legal theory of guaranty
law. 68 Article 115 gives a party the right to have one's deposit, paid as a
guaranty, returned or used to offset payment if performance is
completed.' 69 Similar to the hypothetical cases supra in Section V, the
performing party may be able to request damages in the amount of any
deposit he made to the non-performing party."' However, if the party
paying the deposit performs and the other party does not, the non-
performing party shall return twice the amount of the deposit to the
original payor.''
It is plausible that this double damages provision would not be
effective under a force majeure impediment. Thus, Article 117's
provision that a "party impeded from performance due to a force
majeure event shall not be liable to the performing party for his inability
to perform"'7 would trump Article 115's provision for double deposit
impediment by the third party would not be relevant, due to the fact that the impediment
directly hinders the contracted party from performing, regardless of whether or not the
third party could perform. See CISG, supra note 14, art. 79(2) and NCL, supra note 73,
art. 121.
165. See NCL, supra note 73, art. 115.
166. See CISG, supra note 14, arts. 74-77; see also NCL, supra note 73, art. 115.
167. NCL, supra note 73, art. 115. Article 115 provides for restitution damages to




170. Id. arts. 74-77.
171. See id.; see also Chung-hua jen min kung ho kuo she wai fa kuei hui pien,
supra note 48, at 484.
172. NCL, supra note 73, art. 117. Keep in mind that Article 117 would not
damages. To force the non-performing party to pay double damages
would defeat the purpose of Article 117 and the legal doctrine of force
majeure.
VII. ANALYSIS OF THE POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF THE NCL ON THE
APPLICATION OF THE CISG
For the past several years, a major goal of the PRC has been to
become a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The WTO
provides increased trading areas and substantial trade benefits for its
members. 7 In order to participate in free trade, the National People's
Congress felt that it must promulgate contract laws that are consistent
with the standards of the international community. 74 It was with this in
mind that China enacted the NCL. By comparing the NCL to the older
FECL, one can notice the expanded provisions within the NCL outlining
in detail the necessary conditions that must exist for a contract to be
valid, "'75 how to rescind a contract,'76 when a party can file suit,'77 what
constitutes damages,' and the specifications for declaring a force
majeure event.'79
When applying the force majeure provisions of either the NCL or the
CISG in a Chinese court or before CEITAC, the chances are greater now
that the outcome of such cases would turn out similarly regardless of
which law guided the court. At this point, let us reexamine the
hypotheticals set forth supra in Section V. Remember, the two
hypotheticals earlier produced very different results when Chinese law
was applied in lieu of the CISG. Will the application of the NCL instead
of the FECL produce any different results?
The ISSUE in hypothetical (1) was whether or not a force majeure
event took place, and if so, could the buyer claim damages for return of
his guaranty deposit from the seller. In addition, could seller claim
damages or restitution from buyer for the remaining amount of the
contract price of $600,000. Both parties were from signatory nations to
the CISG. Again, the CISG would be the guiding law since both China
completely trump Article 115's attempt to place the original payor back at status quo; if
the non-performing party had received payment of a deposit as a guaranty for his
performance and is then unable to perform, he would still be liable to the payor for the
amount of deposit. See id.; FECL, supra note 11, art. 24.
173. See generally World Trade Organization Website, available at
http://www.wto.org.
174. See Jiang, supra note 27, at 246.
175. NCL, supra note 73, art. 12.
176. Id. arts. 94, 97.
177. Id. art. 128.
178. Id. arts. 107-22.
179. Id. arts. 117-18.
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and the United States are signatories of the CISG.
HOLDING: Under the NCL, the holding in hypothetical (1) would
remain the same, since the CISG would again govern the court's
decision. A force majeure event did take place, seller would be liable to
buyer for the amount of the guaranty deposit paid prior to the
impediment, and buyer would be liable to seller for the amount of the
contract price, which was $900,000.
The ISSUE in hypothetical (2) was the same as in hypothetical (1),
except that the seller was from Panama, not the United States.
HOLDING: Under the NCL, as under the CISG, the Chinese court
would use the Chinese law as the governing law since Panama is not a
signatory nation of the CISG. However, this time the court would apply
the NCL in lieu of the FECL. The seizure of the goods under an
embargo would constitute a force majeure event under Article 117 of the
NCL since the event was unforeseeable, unavoidable, and unable to be
overcome. Once again, the reasoning for this finding is the same as in
hypothetical (1) as outlined supra in Section V.
As for the restitution issue, buyer would be able to fully recover his
guaranty deposit under Article 115 of the NCL, which stipulates that a
non-performing party is liable for double the amount of the deposit
placed as a guaranty.80 However, under Article 117, the amount the
performing party could claim would be reduced to the actual amount of
deposit given to the non-performing party.' On seller's claim for the
payment of the full price of the goods, the Chinese court would again be
forced to look at the general practice of Chinese contracts.' Once
again, the National People's Congress has neglected to promulgate any
type of passage of risk provisions within the NCL and have left that
entirely to the parties to place into the contract themselves. 3 Since there
was no explicit provision on the passage of risk, the court would again
hold that seller would be liable for the loss of his cargo. However, buyer
can no longer require performance from seller, since Article 110 of the
NCL provides that a party can no longer require performance if the non-
performing party is unable to perform either in law or in fact." A
qualifying force majeure event in this instance would excuse the non-
180. NCL, supra note 73, art. 115.
181. Id. art. 117.
182. General Principles, supra note 26, art. 6.
183. See generally NCL, supra note 73.
184. Id. art. I10.
performing party from that requirement.
VII. CONCLUSION
For decades, the Chinese have attempted to integrate their country
more and more into the international market and economy. However, it
is not easy for a county that has spent thousands of years, under
repressive and often isolationistic regimes, to suddenly throw off its
shackles and come forth as a leading global market and economy. It
takes time. Industrialized Western nations have been involved in
international trade, for the most part, from the time they discovered the
ocean and learned how to sail. Many were involved in international
trade before they knew how to sail or knew what laid on the other side of
the oceans. With such a long history of international trade and a legal
system built on that history, Western industrial nations have yet to
master the fine art of creating a comprehensive and uniform set of laws
that parties from around the globe can rely on and understand. China is
no different.
Although the NCL is considerably more expansive in its scope and
application than the FECL, there is still room for growth. There is no
expectation that China should adopt a new contract law that is identical
to the CISG. However, the NCL should look to include or incorporate
some of the important provisions of CISG, namely, the inclusion of
passage of risk laws. Such an inclusion would create more uniformity in
international trade with China. Furthermore, it would allow trading
partners to enter into contracts with a better understanding of who bears
the risk of loss in any one given situation. Parties would no longer need
to worry about whether or not Chinese law or the CISG will be applied
and whether or not any passage of risk provisions apply.
Within the new global economy, a smart businessman would work to
negotiate a series clauses in the contract regarding the passage of risk,
scope of force majeure events or effects, guaranty deposits, and time
limits for notification of inability to perform and recission.
Additionally, areas that one might want to include in a force majeure
clause are whether or not partial performance is available and the
procedure necessary to invoke the force majeure clause.
Aside from the lack of certain provisions in the NCL, the
promulgation of the NCL has placed China in the right direction for the
new millennium. The expanded provisions of the NCL provide more
clarity, predictability, and uniformity than its predecessor, the FECL.
Some may argue that the NCL is simply window-dressing to appease the
international community, and there may be some validity to that.
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However, with China's impending acceptance into the WTO, 85 China
will undoubtedly turn that window-dressing into reality. Maybe then,
Foreign parties will begin to see Chinese courts enforcing laws and
regulations with more predictability adding to global uniformity.
DONALD L. GRACE
185. China's entrance into the WTO appears to be rapidly advancing. China has
gained permanent Most Favored Nation status with the United States, China's entry into
the WTO seems to be an inevitable event within the next few years.
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